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Abstract
In this paper, we study a mechanism design problem for a strategic variant of
the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and prior-
free environment. In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set
of bins without exceeding the capacity of any singular bin. In the strategic
variant of the problem we study, bins are held by strategic agents, and each
agent may hide its compatibility with some items in order to obtain items of
higher values. The compatibility between an agent and an item encodes the
willingness of the agent to receive the item. Our goal is to maximize total
value (sum of agents’ values, or social welfare) while certifying no agent can
benefit from hiding its compatibility with items. The model has applications
in auctions with budgeted bidders.
Keywords: Mechanism Design without Money, Generalized Assignment
Problem, Truthfulness, Approximation
1. Introduction
Truthful mechanism design without money under general preferences is
a classic topic in social choice theory. Truthfulness ensures that no agent
can be better off by manipulating its true preferences. When searching for
truthful mechanisms without money, one has to look at restricted domains
of preferences. The reason for this, is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
which states that any truthful social choice function which selects an out-
come among three or more alternatives has to be trivially aligned with the
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preference of a single agent (namely, the dictator) [1, 2]. Thus, exploring
domains for which there exist truthful mechanisms is of central importance
in the field of social choice theory.
As an example for restricted domains, consider agents with single-peaked
preferences. In this domain returning the median of the peaks determines
a truthful social choice [3]. Another example is the two-sided matching, in
which a set of men has a strict preference ordering over a set of women, and
vice versa. A matching is an assignment of men to women where each side
is assigned to only one element of the other side. The deferred acceptance
algorithm finds a stable matching which is truthful for the proposing side,
but not necessarily truthful for the other side [4].
One way to circumvent the impossibility result is relaxing the social choice
function. Procaccia and Tennenholtz introduced the technique of welfare ap-
proximation as a means to derive truthful approximation mechanisms with-
out money [5]. This type of approximation is not meant to handle compu-
tational intractability, but a method to achieve truthfulness by relaxing the
goal of optimizing social welfare (approximating social welfare), and thus cir-
cumventing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem. The approach
is to maximize welfare without considering incentives, and refer to this as
optimal value. Then it is said that a truthful mechanism returns (at most)
an α-approximation of the optimal if its value is always greater than or equal
to 1/α times the optimal value (α ≥ 1). Several works, subsequent to the
work of Procaccia and Tennenholtz, employ this technique [6, 7, 8]. We apply
this technique to a novel strategic setting in the following.
1.1. Model
Consider a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem termed
GAP-BS in an environment which is both prior-free and payment-free. In
GAP-BS, there are m items J and n bins (knapsacks) I. Each bin i has a
capacity Ci and associates a value vij and a size wij to any item j. A feasible
assignment may allocate a subset of items S to bin i such that
∑
j∈S wij ≤ Ci.
A feasible assignment may assign each item at most once.
In GAP-BS, we assume tuple T = ({vij}ij , {wij}ij , {Ci}i) is public, but
each bin is held by a strategic agent. The private information that each
agent/bin holds is the set of its compatible items. The compatibility between
an agent and an item encodes the willingness of the agent to receive the
item. In particular, consider a bipartite graph G where one side corresponds
to items and the other side corresponds to bins. The edges of G, E ⊆
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I × J represent the compatible item-bin pairs. The private type of a bin
i is therefore the set of edges in the graph incident on i, i.e. Ei. A bin i
receives value vi(S) =
∑
j∈S:(i,j)∈Ei vij from package S if
∑
j∈S wij < Ci and 0,
otherwise. The total value of a feasible assignment (S1, S2, . . . , Sn) equals the
sum of values received by the bins from the assignment:
∑
i∈I vi(Si). We seek
a total value-maximizing algorithm that provides each bin i with incentives
to truthfully report its compatible items Ei rather than any E
′
i ⊂ Ei.1 In
other words, given a truthful mechanism, bins have no incentive to hide their
compatibility with some items.
Let A denote a randomized algorithm which takes instance (T,E) and
computes X ∈ {0, 1}E, an assignment of items to bins. Notice, the assign-
ment itself is a deterministic assignment (each bin receives a deterministic
set of items), but algorithm A is internally randomized, i.e., A returns a
solution which is randomly chosen according to a probability distribution
over feasible assignments. Thus, the computed assignment may change by
running A, twice on the same input. Randomized algorithm A, given any
tuple T , should satisfy the following properties.
i. (feasibility) ∀j ∈ J , Pr[∑i∈I Xij ≤ 1] = 1 and ∀i ∈ I, Pr[
∑
j∈J wijXij ≤
Ci] = 1, where X ∼ A(T,E), for all E.
ii. (incentive compatibility, or truthfulness) for all i, Ei, E−i, and any
reported E ′i ⊂ Ei, we have E[
∑
j:(i,j)∈Ei vijXij] ≥ E[
∑
j:(i,j)∈Ei vijX
′
ij],
where X ∼ A(T,E), and X ′ ∼ A(T,E ′i ∪ E−i).
E−i always denotes E \Ei. The expectation in ii is taken over the coin flips
of the algorithm. Note that, the expected value of the bin in both cases
is calculated with respect to true item-bin compatibilities, E. We remark
that condition ii characterizes mechanisms that are dominant strategy in-
centive compatible. In this paper, for brevity, we refer to these mechanisms
as truthful mechanisms or algorithms. To sum, our objective is to propose
a randomized algorithm A for GAP-BS which is truthful, and always returns
a feasible assignment whose value approximates the optimal total value as
high as possible.
1In fact, our results certify that each bin i reports exactly Ei, and has no incentives to
report any other set of edges E′
i
. However, for the sake of simplicity in the exposition of
the results, we focus on untruthful reports that are made by hiding some edges, E′
i
⊂ Ei.
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Many real-world decision problems can be modeled by variants of knap-
sack problems, therefore we believe that our model can be applied broadly.
As an example, we refer to the maximum budgeted allocations (MBA) prob-
lem [9]. In MBA, a set of indivisible items has to be assigned to a set of
bidders. Each bidder i reports her willingness to pay bij for item j by bid-
ding for the item, while she has a budget constraint Bi. Each bidder i on
receiving a package S of items, pays
∑
j∈S bij . Each bidder i has the rigid
constraint Bi on her payment. The goal in MBA is to find a distribution of
items among the bidders which maximizes the total revenue (the sum of the
payments by the bidders while respecting their budget constraints). MBA
arises in auctions with budgeted bidders and has several applications [9].
In MBA, bidders want to get as much as they can without spending
more than their budget. For instance, advertisers wish to maximize the
impressions, clicks, or sales generated by their advertising, subject to budget
constraints. Similarly, bidders who have no direct utility for leftover money
(e.g. because the money comes from a corporate budget) will buy as much as
possible. This types of bidders are called value maximizers, and have recently
drawn the attention of researchers in mechanism design [10, 11].
Consider a strategic variant of MBA in which each bidder, in order to
obtain a more valuable package of items, strategizes in the following way.
Each bidder may strategically hide her interests in buying some items by
not bidding for those items. In this setting, the auctioneer wishes to certify
that each bidder truthfully reveals her willingness to buy items. In other
words, a truthful mechanism in this setting will encourage participation of
the bidders in the auction. We model this setting by GAP-BS in which each
bidder is represented by a bin, budgets Bi by capacities Ci, the bids bij by
the values of bins for the items vij , and the payment by a bidder i for item
j by the weight of the item on the bin, wij. Thus, in this setting of GAP-BS,
we have vij = wij for all i and j. For this problem, since the value density
of each item is the same over all bins, we provide a truthful 4-approximation
algorithm.
1.2. Discussion About the Assumptions
Aside from the applications of the model discussed above, we emphasize
that our assumptions (which imply a highly structured domain) are necessary
to escape the impossibility results such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
and its variations [12]. For example, we resort to welfare approximations
because as stated by Theorem 1, no deterministic (or randomized) algorithm
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whose value is optimal, exists for GAP-BS. The lower bounds in Theorem
1 were derived for a different setting with strategic items in the literature,
however, we can reproduce and adapt the theorem for our setting.
Theorem 1. [6] No truthful deterministic algorithm with an approximation
ratio better than 2 exists for GAP-BS. Moreover, no truthful-in-expectation
randomized algorithm with an approximation ratio better than 1.09 exists for
GAP-BS.
Now, we consider a setting in which bins/agents have private values for
items. This setting is more general than GAP-BS in that, in this setting,
the agents can manipulate their valuations for items. This is in contrast to
GAP-BS in which the agents can only hide their valuations for some items
by hiding their compatibility with those items. For this general setting, no
deterministic (or randomized) truthful algorithm, with an interesting approx-
imation ratio, exists. To see this, consider a simple market with one item,
and a set of agents. This market is equivalent to the single-item auction,
but without money. We observe that no mechanism without money can find
the (true) highest valuation for the item, as the agents can report arbitrarily
high values for the item. That is, no truthful algorithm can do any better
than the algorithm which allocates the item to the bin which is uniformly
chosen at random. Such an algorithm provides a trivial approximation ratio
of 1/n, n being the number of agents.
In a parallel setting, Dughmi et al. [6] and Chen et al. [7] studied GAP
in an environment in which items are held by strategic agents. This is in
contrast to our assumption that bins are held by strategic agents. Hence,
the solutions proposed by these authors are not directly applicable to GAP-
BS. In GAP each item can be assigned only once, thus the setting studied
by Dughmi et al. is appropriate for modeling single-demand bidders who
are interested in buying only a single item. However, our model analyzes
strategic bins which can model multi-demand bidders, i.e., bidders who are
interested in buying multiple items. In particular, the sizes in our model are
at the side of strategic agents which properly models the bidders’ budgets in
MBA problem.
1.3. Results and Technique
In addition to GAP-BS, we also analyze two variants, namely the multiple
knapsack problem in which each item has the same size and value over bins,
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and density-invariant GAP in which each item has the same value density
(value per size) over the bins.
We observe that the relaxation and rounding technique is applicable to
these problems. The relaxation and rounding technique is a welfare approx-
imation technique [5] based on linear programming relaxations. To apply
the technique, we start with a linear programming relaxation of the prob-
lem. Then, we need an algorithm which returns a fractional solution to the
relaxation with an acceptable approximation ratio. The algorithm has to be
fractionally truthful, i.e., no agent can increase its fractional value by un-
truthful reports. Finally, a rounding scheme which preserves truthfulness is
applied to the fractional solution to obtain an integer solution. It should be
noted that the relaxation and rounding technique has been previously ap-
plied to mechanism design without money in a different setting [6]. This fact
is realized in Theorem 2.
We apply the technique successfully to our problems by proposing frac-
tionally truthful algorithms with acceptable approximation ratios. For the
rounding scheme, we use a rounding method called randomized meta-rounding,
originally proposed by Carr and Vempala [13], and later applied by Lavi and
Swamy [14] to mechanism design (with quasi-linear valuations). Using the
relaxation and rounding technique, for two variants of GAP-BS, the mul-
tiple knapsack problem, and density-invariant GAP, we propose truthful 4-
approximation algorithms. For GAP-BS, we show anO(ln (U/L))-approximation
mechanism where U and L are the upper and lower bounds for value densities
of the compatible item-bin pairs.
2. Generalized Assignment Problem
We start with a linear programming relaxation of GAP-BS.
Maximize
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 vijxij (LP[E])
subject to
∑n
i=1 xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J∑m
j=1wijxij ≤ Ci ∀i ∈ I
xij ≥ 0 ∀i, j
xij = 0 ∀(i, j) /∈ E.
Our technique is as follows. We design a fractionally truthful approxi-
mation algorithm which returns a feasible solution to LP[E]. A fractionally
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truthful algorithm allocates fractional assignments to bins, and no bin can
improve its fractional value by an untruthful report. In particular, a frac-
tionally truthful algorithm AF takes (T,E) and returns x ∈ [0, 1]E, a fea-
sible solution to LP[E] with the following property. For each bin i, if the
bin reports E ′i ⊂ Ei, we will have
∑
j:(i,j)∈E vijxij ≥
∑
j:(i,j)∈E vijx
′
ij , where
x′ = AF (T,E ′i ∪ E−i) and E−i = E \ Ei. Next, we round the fractional
solution using a special rounding technique which makes sure that each bin
obtains a fixed fraction of its fractional value in expectation. The randomized
meta-rounding is capable of maintaining this fixed fraction.
To use the randomized meta-rounding, we have to scale down the frac-
tional solution by factor 2, which is essentially the integrality gap of the
LP[E] [15]. Assuming x∗ = AF (T,E), the randomized meta-rounding rep-
resents x∗/2 as a convex combination of polynomially-many feasible integer
solutions. Looking at the provided convex combination as a probability dis-
tribution over integer solutions, we sample a randomized solution X which
is always feasible, and its expected value is 1/2 of the fractional value of x∗.
This is confirmed by Theorem 2 from the literature.
Theorem 2. [6] If there exists a fractionally truthful α-approximation algo-
rithm for GAP-BS, then there exists a truthful (2α)-approximation solution
for GAP-BS.
2.1. Multiple Knapsack Problem
We consider a variant of GAP-BS in which neither the size nor the value
of each item depends on the bins. Formally, for each item j we have vij = vj
and wij = wj for all bins i. First, we observe an algorithm that returns a
(fractional) optimal solution to LP[E] is not fractionally truthful. For more
details, we provide Example 1 relegated to the Appendix.
We propose Algorithm 1. We choose bin i in an arbitrary order and
(fractionally) assign compatible items to it according to the decreasing order
of value densities of items vj/wj until the capacity of the bin is exhausted or
all compatible items are exhausted. Then we proceed to the next bin with
remaining (fractional) items.
Algorithm 1 is fractionally truthful. It is known that assigning items
according to decreasing order of value densities, when fractional assignments
are allowed, produces the highest fractional value for the bin. Since bins
wish to maximize their values, and the algorithm is aligned with this goal,
the bins have no incentive to lie, and the algorithm is fractionally truthful.
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Algorithm 1: Multiple Knapsack Problem.
1. Sort items according to the decreasing order of value densities
vj/wj, breaking ties arbitrarily.
2. foreach bin i chosen in an arbitrary order do
for each unassigned (fractional) item j where (i, j) ∈ E in the
order defined above, fractionally assign as much of the item to bin
i until the item is exhausted or the bin is full.
end
return the resulting assignment x.
For example, consider a bin with capacity M ≫ 1, and two items 1 and 2
such that v1 = 1+ ǫ, w1 = 1, and v2 = w2 =M . Algorithm 1 assigns item 1,
and M−1
M
-fraction of item 2 to the bin, resulting in 1 + ǫ + M−1
M
M = M + ǫ
value for the bin, the highest possible value. If fractional allocations were
not allowed, only item 1 could be assigned to the bin since the remaining
capacity (M − 1) is not sufficient to assign item 2. Thus, in the absence of
fractional allocations, the bin has incentives to hide its compatibility with
item 1 in order to obtain item 2.
With regard to the total value, we show that Algorithm 1 returns a 2-
approximate fractional solution. We compare the outcome of the algorithm
with the optimal solution to the LP formulation of the problem shown below.
Maximize
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 vjxij (MKP-LP[E])
subject to
∑n
i=1 xij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ J∑m
j=1wjxij ≤ Ci, ∀i ∈ I
xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j
xij = 0, ∀(i, j) /∈ E.
Assignment x computed by Algorithm 1 is a feasible assigment since each
item is assigned only once, and the capacity of the bins are respected by the
algorithm. Thus, x belongs to the region of feasible solutions to MKP-LP[E].
Lemma 1. Algorithm 1 returns a 2-approximation solution to MKP-LP[E].
Proof. We will construct a feasible dual solution with a value at most twice
the value obtained by the algorithm, then by calling the weak duality theo-
rem, the claim will follow. Assume x is the outcome of Algorithm 1. Using x
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we can construct a feasible solution to the dual of MKP-LP[E] given below.
Minimize
∑m
j=1 pj +
∑n
i=1 uiCi (MKP-LPD[E])
subject to pj + uiwj ≥ vj, ∀(i, j) ∈ E
ui ≥ 0, ∀i
pj ≥ 0, ∀j.
Initially, let p = ~0 and u = ~0. If item j gets exhausted, set pj = vj . Further-
more, for all full bins i, set ui = vj/wj , j being the last item (fractionally)
assigned to i. We can observe that this satisfies the constraint corresponding
to each edge (i, j). In particular, if bin i is full, then for each j incident on
i, either j gets exhausted with this assignment or does not. If j is exhausted
we have pj = vj and therefore the constraint holds. If j is not exhausted, we
have vj/wj ≤ ui since items are assigned in decreasing order of value density
and thus the constraint holds. If bin i is not full, every item j which is
assigned to it is exhausted by this assignment. That is we have pj = vj and
the constraint thus holds. For every item j which is not assigned to the bin
but (i, j) ∈ E, we have pj = vj since the item is exhausted due to another
assignment. In sum, we have constructed a feasible dual solution using x.
Now, we bound the value of the dual solution with respect to the pri-
mal solution. First, we observe that
∑
i,j vjxij ≥
∑
j pj
∑
i xij , since pj =
vj if j is fully exhausted and pj = 0, otherwise. Second,
∑
i,j vjxij =∑
i
∑
j
vj
wj
(wjxij) ≥
∑
i ui
∑
j(wijxij), since if xij > 0 then vj/wj ≥ ui.
Therefore, we obtain
2
∑
i,j vjxij ≥
∑
j pj
∑
i xij +
∑
i ui
∑
j(wjxij)
=
∑
j pj +
∑
i uiCi
Notice, only for items j which get exhausted (
∑
i xij = 1) we have pj > 0
and only for full bins (
∑
j wjxij = Ci) we have ui > 0. The final term is the
value of the dual, the desired conclusion.
Finally, we call Theorem 2 and obtain the following.
Theorem 3. There exists a truthful 4-approximation mechanism for the mul-
tiple knapsack problem in our model.
9
2.2. Truthful Mechanism for GAP-BS
Now, we attempt to design a truthful algorithm for GAP-BS, but first solve
the problem with an additional assumption. We assume that the value den-
sity of each item is the same over all bins. More formally, there exists a value
dj for each item j such that for all bins i, we have
vij
wij
= dj. This assump-
tion will be relaxed in Subsection 2.3. We design a truthful 4-approximation
mechanism for GAP-BS under this extra assumption.
The proposed algorithm can be viewed as a variant of the deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm designed for matching marketplaces. Each item j has
a preference list Lj according to decreasing order of vij where (i, j) ∈ E,
breaking ties arbitrarily. The preference list of a bin is defined according to
the decreasing order of value densities. Once a (fractional) item and a bin
are matched, the assignment will never be broken.
Algorithm 2: GAP with Equal Density
Data: Preference lists of the items, {Lj}j.
Result: A feasible solution x to LP[E].
1. Sort items according to their decreasing order of value densities dj,
breaking ties arbitrarily.
2. foreach item j chosen according to the order above do
Fractionally assign as much of the item to the bins chosen
according to the order specified by Lj , until the item is exhausted
or all the bins in Lj are full.
return the resulting assignment x.
To show the approximation factor of the solution, we can construct a
feasible dual solution whose value is at most twice the value obtained by
Algorithm 2, then by calling the weak duality theorem, the following lemma
holds.
Lemma 2. Algorithm 2 returns a 2-approximation solution to LP[E] when
each item has the same value density over bins.
The truthfulness proof of Algorithm 2 proceeds as follows. We first show
that in an instance with 2 items and 2 bins (2 × 2), truthfulness holds.
This instance contains the core of the truthfulness proof for the general case.
Truthfulness for simpler cases is trivial. A straightforward generalization of
the argument for 2 × 2 shows truthfulness for settings with m items and 2
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bins (2 ×m) for any m > 2. For the general case of (n ×m) we provide an
inductive argument.
In order to show that Algorithm 2 is fractionally truthful, we look at
Algorithm 2 as a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm where items
propose capacities to bins. In Step 2 of the algorithm, we process items one
by one. For each item, we try to assign the item or part of the item to the
bins according to the decreasing order of the item values for the bins. To
simplify the exposition of the proof, we view this process as items proposing
to the bins. When bin i reveals its compatibility with item j, we view it as
bin i accepting (possible) proposal by item j as far as the capacity of the bin
permits. Similarly, bin i hiding its compatibility with item j can be viewed
as bin i rejecting (possible) proposals by item j, or equivalently not allowing
item j to propose to bin i.
Lemma 3. Algorithm 2 is fractionally truthful for 2× 2 settings.
Proof. Let 1, and 2 denote the bins, and p and q denote the items. Let us
assume p precedes q in proposing to the bins, i.e. dp ≥ dq. Fix this order
of proposing items as well as the reports by bin 2. We argue that bin 1 is
never better off by hiding some of its edges E1. Showing the truthfulness for
bin 2 is analogue.
Assume (1,q) ∈ E1. Then bin 1 may receive a proposal from q, but
obviously the bin receives no proposal from q if the bin reports (1,q) /∈ E1.
Thus, hiding compatibility with q might only make a loss for the bin.
Now, we analyze the behavior of the algorithm for a similar change in
report for item p. We need to show that when (1,p) ∈ E1 (case I) the
obtained value by the bin is at least as good as when (1,p) /∈ E1 (case II).
Then we conclude that when truely (1,p) ∈ E1, the bin has no incentive to
report (1,p) /∈ E1.
In case I, if only a fraction of the proposal by p is accepted by the bin,
then the bin has become full by accepting a fraction of p (recall p precedes
q in proposing to the bins). Thus the obtained value by the bin is maximum
and can’t be better off in case II. If in case I no fraction of the proposal by
p is accepted by bin 1, or if there is no proposal by p then there will be no
improvement in the value of the bin in case II, as well. What remains is to
show that the bin cannot be better off in case II when it accepts the proposal
by p fully in case I.
This situation is depicted in Figure 2.1. In the figure, (a) and (b) corre-
spond to case I and case II, respectively. In the figure, Cij denotes the capac-
11
pq
1
2
C1p
0
C1q
C2q
(a) Case I. p is exhausted when it is assigned to 1.
p
q
1
2
C2p
C ′1q
C ′2q
(b) Case II. 1 hides its compatibility with p. At least a fraction of q is
assigned to 1 (C ′1q > 0).
Figure 2.1: Two cases where the bin is and is not on the preference list of the item. The
amount of proposed and accepted capacities are shown on the edges.
ity proposed by item j to bin i, which is accepted by the bin. Considering
the information provided in Fig. 2.1, we need to show that C ′1q ≤ C1q +C1p.
This will mean, in case II, the bin actually receives less capacity from items
with less (or equal) value densities than in case I, which in turn means a lower
value for bin 1. Notice, to arrive at this inequality we used the assumption
that the order of proposing items is fixed in the two setups. To show the
inequality, we first observe two facts about Algorithm 2.
Observation 1. If a set of items together propose a capacity of C0 ≤ C
to a bin with capacity C, the bin will accept the whole proposed capacity. If
we first let a capacity C1 propose to the bin and afterwards let the foregoing
items propose the capacity C0, the bin will reject a capacity of at most C1
from the items that propose after the first capacity.
Proof. Assume C1 and C0 in order propose to the bin. If the bin gets full
by accepting C1 we must have C1 ≥ C, then the bin will reject exactly a
capacity of C0 of the next items. Now because C0 ≤ C ≤ C1, the claim
holds. If not (the bin still has an empty capacity of CE after accepting C1),
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the bin accepts C1 fully and rejects an amount equal to max{0, C0 − CE}
from the next proposing capacities. We have C1 + CE = C ≥ C0, therefore
C0−CE ≤ C1. Thus, in this case the rejected capacity will be upper bounded
by C1. This completes the proof.
Observation 2. Let 1 and 2 be two subsequent bins in Lj. If bin 1 rejects
the proposed capacity C1j by item j then, this is an upper bound to C2j, the
capacity that will be proposed by item j to 2, i.e. C1j ≥ C2j.
Proof. First, we must have w1j ≥ w2j since v1jw1j =
v2j
w2j
by the assumption of
equal density over bins and v1j ≥ v2j as 1 precedes 2 in Lj. Rejecting C1j
means that this fraction of the item remains: C1j/w1j . Then what will be
proposed to 2 is C2j = w2j · (C1j/w1j) ≤ C1j. This completes the proof.
Back to the argument about cases I and II, we notice that in case II there
is an increase of amount C2p in the proposed capacity to 2 compared to case
I. The capacity rejected by bin 2 is thus upper bounded by C2p according
to Observation 1. That means, C2q − C ′2q ≤ C2p. Moreover, according to
Observation 2, the rejected capacity upper bounds the proposed capacity to
the next bin. Hence, we have C ′1q − C1q ≤ C2q − C ′2q. Therefore, we obtain
C ′1q ≤ C1q + C2p ≤ C1q + C1p. The last inequality holds again because of
Observation 2 (see it as bin 1 rejecting C1p, an upper bound to C2p). This
completes the proof of Lemma 3.
A simple generalization of the argument for 2 × 2 markets shows truth-
fulness for the 2×m markets with m > 2. A useful observation here is that
we only need to show that bin 1 will always report E1 rather than E1 \ {ej}
for every ej ∈ E1 . If we show this, we have in fact shown that reporting E1
is better than reporting E1 \ {ej}. This also shows that reporting E1 \ {ej}
is better than hiding one edge from E1 \{ej}, i.e. reporting E1 \{ej, ej′} and
so on. For the general case we provide an inductive argument. We assume
that in a (n − 1) × m setting bins are truthful and prove that in a n × m
setting truthfulness holds as well.
Lemma 4. If Algorithm 2 is truthful for markets with m items and n − 1
bins, it will be truthful for n×m markets for n ≥ 3, and m ≥ 2.
Proof. Consider bin i and fix the reports of other bins denoted by -i. We
assume (i,p) ∈ Ei (case I) and show that the bin will never be better off by
reporting (i,p) /∈ Ei (case II). We compare the utility of the bin in the two
13
cases under a fixed order of proposing items. The two cases are depicted in
Figure 2.2. Since the items before p are assigned similarly in both cases, we
only consider the items which are processed after p denoted by -p.
p
-p
i
-i
Cip
Ci,−p
C−i,−p
(a) Case I. p is exhausted when it is assigned to i. i may get a fraction or
nothing from other items -p.
p
-p
i
-i
C−i,p
C ′i,−p
C ′−i,−p
(b) Case II. i hides its compatibility with p. At least a fraction of -p is
assigned to i. p is (fully) accepted by -i.
Figure 2.2: Two cases where the bin shows or hides its compatibility with an item.
We show that C ′i,−p ≤ Cip + Ci,−p, where Ci,−p =
∑
q∈−pCi,q and C
′
i,−p =∑
q∈−pC
′
i,q. This means that bin i in case II actually receives less capacity
from items with less (or equal) value densities than case I, which in turn
implies lower value for the bin.
Consider case II. We look closer at the bin(s) to which item p will be
assigned. We assume p is (fractionally) assigned to at least one bin otherwise
we have Ci,−p = C
′
i,−p and thus the claim holds. Let bin 1 be the first bin to
which p will be assigned.
We assume bin 1 gets full at some point otherwise this bin accepts the
extra capacity (C1p, the capacity proposed by item p to bin 1) without
rejecting any capacity and therefore we have Ci,−p = C
′
i,−p and thus the
claim holds. When bin 1 gets full, some of the currently proposing items to
bin 1 will stop proposing to it and go to the next bin in their preference list.
Let us call these capacities C1. C1 is upper bounded by C1p according to
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Observation 1 which in turn is upper bounded by Cip based on Observation
2: C1 ≤ C1p ≤ Cip. If C1 directly proposes to bin i, the bin won’t be better
off in case II because C1 ≤ Cip. The situation is worse for bin i, if C1 goes to
the other bins. One can view this situation as bin i rejecting capacity C1 in a
(n−1)×m setting where bin 1 (which is now full) and its absorbed capacities
are eliminated. According to our induction assumption, this strategy will not
make bin i better off in a (n− 1)×m setting. This completes the proof.
Taking into account, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we obtain the following.
Lemma 5. Algorithm 2 is fractionally truthful.
Finally, by calling Theorem 2, we obtain the following.
Theorem 4. There exists a truthful 4-approximation mechanism for GAP-BS
when each item has the same value density over all bins.
2.3. Unequal Value Densities
We presented a truthful 4-approximate mechanism for GAP-BS when each
item has a unique value density over all bins. Now we explain how to relax
this assumption at the expense of a logarithmic loss in the total value. Con-
sider those edges in E, e = (k, l) and e′ = (k′, l′) whose value densities are
respectively upper and lower bounds over all value densities:
L =
vk′l′
wk′l′
≤ vij
wij
≤ vkl
wkl
= U, ∀(i, j) ∈ E.
Let us assume U and L are publicly known. This assumption will be removed
later. Knowing this information we choose a density value d uniformly at
random from the set D = {U, U
2
, U
4
, . . . , U
2O(ln (U/L))
}. Then we define a new
valuation vˆ as follows. For every edge (i, j) in E with
vij
wij
< d we set vˆij = 0,
or equivalently the edge is discarded from the graph. For every
vij
wij
≥ d,
define vˆij such that
vˆij
wij
= d. Notice that always vˆij ≤ vij . Now we have
an instance of GAP-BS with equal densities for which there exists a truthful
4-approximate mechanism according to Theorem 4. To ensure truthfulness,
in the end, if item j is assigned to bin i by the subroutine for equal value
densities, we withdraw the item with probability 1− vˆij
vij
. In other words, we
let the bin hold the item with probability
vˆij
vij
. If item j is assigned to bin i,
the generated value for the bin will be vij , but if we let the bin hold the item
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with probability
vˆij
vij
, then the expected value will be vˆij . This way, we make
sure that each item has the same value density over all bins as it is required
by the subroutine to guarantee truthfulness.
SetD contains O(ln (U/L)) densities, and each density has the probability
of p = 1
O(ln (U/L))
to be chosen. At least half of each valuation vij with
probability p is counted in the expected total value; therefore, we obtain an
O(ln (U/L)) approximation factor.
To remove the assumption that U and L are public, we certify that the
bins k and k′ wouldn’t hide the corresponding edges. To this end, we run
one of the following three algorithms with probability 1/3. i) Let bin k (the
owner of edge e) choose all its desired items and assign nothing to the other
bins. ii) Let bin k′ (the owner of e′) choose all its desired items and assign
nothing to the other bins. iii) Exclude bin k and k′ and run the algorithm
above for all other bins using U and L obtained from the two excluded bins.
One can observe that the two bins k and k′ cannot do any better by hiding
their edges. Also, it is easy to observe that the approximation factor is still
O(ln (U/L)). Thus, we obtain the following.
Theorem 5. There exists a truthful O(ln (U/L)) approximate mechanism
for GAP-BS.
We leave open the question of whether there exists a truthful mechanism
with a constant factor of approximation for GAP-BS.
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Appendix A.
Proof of Theorem 1 No truthful deterministic algorithm with an approxi-
mation ratio better than 2 exists for GAP-BS. Moreover, no truthful-in-expectation
randomized algorithm with an approximation ratio better than 1.09 exists for
GAP-BS.
Proof. Consider a small market with two bins and two items shown in Figure
A.1 (a). In this market, bins have capacity 1, and are both compatible with
the two items. Item B is more valuable to both bins (x > 1), but each
item has size 1. This market can be viewed as an instance for both the
multiple-knapsack problem (Subsection 2.1), and the density-invariant GAP
(Subsection 2.2).
Regarding deterministic mechanisms, an arbitrary truthful mechanism
has to assign item B to one bin. Without loss of generality, assume B is
assigned to bin 2, i.e., the tie is broken deterministically (alphabetically) in
favor of bin 2. Now, consider reports in (b) of Figure A.1. The mechanism,
in case (b), cannot assign B to bin 1 as it violates truthfulness. Thus, the
mechanism assigns B to 2, and this results in an approximation ratio of x+1
x
which tends to 2 when x gets very close to 1.
An arbitrary truthful-in-expectation mechanism, in case (a), assigns B to
one bin with a probability less than or equal 1/2. Without loss of generality,
let bin 1 be that bin. The utility of bin 1, in this case, will be at most x+1
2
for
x > 1. Assume, in case (b), item B is assigned to bin 1 with probability q,
resulting a q · x expected value for bin 1. Truthfulness stipulates no increase
in the utility of bin 1 in case (b), i.e., x+1
2
≥ q · x, thus q ≤ x+1
2x
. In case
(b), the total expected value will be q(1 + x) − (1 − q)x = x + q, thus the
approximation ratio will be x+1
x+q
. In order to obtain a smaller approximation
ratio, we plug in q = x+1
2x
. The ratio gets a value of 1 + 1
4
√
2+5
≈ 1.094 for
x = 1 +
√
2, the desired conclusion.
Proof of Theorem 2. If there exists a fractionally truthful α-approximation
algorithm for GAP-BS, then there exists a truthful (2α)-approximation solu-
tion for GAP-BS.
Proof. Let AF denote a fractionally truthful algorithm for GAP-BS that takes
an instance (T,E) and returns a feasible solution to LP[E]. Let x∗ be the out-
come of AF on instance (T,E). Let {X l}l∈L denote the set of feasible integer
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C1 = 1
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(a) True edges.
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B
x
1
1
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C1 = 1
C2 = 1
(b) Manipulated edges.
Figure A.1: Circles represent items and squares represent bins. The value
size
of each item is
on its left. Each bin has a capacity of 1. Selected assignments are in bold.
solutions to LP[E], where L indexes all feasible integer solutions. The inte-
grality gap of LP[E] equals 2 [15], thus we scale down the fractional solution
by factor 2. The meta-randomized rounding applied to x∗/2 computes a
probability distribution over feasible integer solutions whose support is poly-
nomial [13, 14]:
x∗
2
=
∑
l∈L λlX
l,
∑
l∈L λl = 1, and ∀l ∈ L, λl ≥ 0.
We treat the convex decomposition above as a probability distribution
according to which solution X l has probability λl of being selected. Let X
be a solution sampled from the above distribution. Obviously X is feasible by
the construction of the distribution. We also have E[Xij ] =
1
2
x∗ij for all i and j
from the construction of the distribution. By the linearity of expectation, the
expected value of a bin is E[
∑
j:(i,j)∈E vijXij] =
1
2
∑
j:(i,j)∈E vijx
∗
ij . Therefore,
the expected value of the solution is exactly half of the value of the fractional
solution.
For truthfulness, fix bin i and E−i = E \ Ei. Suppose the bin reports
E ′i ⊂ Ei rather than Ei. Let x′ = AF (T,E ′i ∪ E−i), and X ′ be the solution
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returned by the meta-randomized rounding from x′/2. We have
E[
∑
j:(i,j)∈E vijXij] =
1
2
∑
j:(i,j)∈E vijx
∗
ij
≥ 1
2
∑
j:(i,j)∈E vijx
′
ij
= E[
∑
j:(i,j)∈E vijX
′
ij ]
The inequality is because AF is fractionally truthful. Therefore, the bin
cannot improve its expected value by hiding some of its edges. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Algorithm 2 returns a 2-approximation solution to
LP[E] when each item has the same value density over bins.
Proof. An argument similar to that of Lemma 1 in addition to some required
modifications will show the claim. Assume x is the outcome of Algorithm 2.
Using x we can construct a feasible solution to the dual of LP[E] (LPD[E]
given below) which is not greater than twice the value of x. Then we call the
weak LP-duality theorem and conclude that x is a 2 approximate solution to
LP[E].
LPD[E]:
Minimize
∑m
j=1 pj +
∑n
i=1 uiCi
subject to pj + uiwij ≥ vij, ∀(i, j) ∈ E
ui ≥ 0, ∀i
pj ≥ 0, ∀j.
Initially, let p = ~0 and u = ~0. If item j gets exhausted when assigned to
bin i, set pj = vij . Furthermore, for all full bins i, set ui = dj, j being the
last item (fractionally) assigned to i. We can observe that this satisfies the
constraint corresponding to each edge (i, j). In particular, if bin i is full, then
for each j incident on i, j either gets exhausted with this assignment or does
not. If j is exhausted, we have pj = vij and therefore the constraint holds.
If j is not exhausted, we have vij/wij = dj ≤ ui since items are assigned in
decreasing order of value density and thus the constraint holds. If bin i is
not full, every item j which is assigned to it is exhausted by this assignment.
That is we have pj = vij and the constraint thus holds. For every item j
which is not assigned to the bin but (i, j) ∈ E, we have pj ≥ vij since the
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item is exhausted due to an assignment (i′, j) ∈ E with vi′j ≥ vij. Therefore,
we have constructed a feasible dual solution using x.
Now, we bound the value of the dual solution with respect to the primal
solution. First, we observe that
∑
i,j vijxij ≥
∑
j pj
∑
i xij , since pj lower
bounds the value of any edge on which any part of item j is assigned (xij > 0)
because the item goes to bins according to the order specified by Lj. Second,∑
i,j vijxij =
∑
i
∑
j
vij
wij
(wijxij) ≥
∑
i ui
∑
j(wijxij), since if xij > 0 then
vij
wij
= dj ≥ ui. Therefore, we obtain
2
∑
i,j vijxij ≥
∑
j pj
∑
i xij +
∑
i ui
∑
j(wijxij)
=
∑
j pj +
∑
i uiCi
Notice, only for item j which gets exhausted (
∑
i xij = 1), we have pj > 0
and only for full bins (
∑
j wjxij = Ci) we have ui > 0. The final term is the
value of the dual, the desired conclusion.
Example 1 (Multiple Knapsack Example). we observe an algorithm that
returns a (fractional) optimal solution to LP[E] is not fractionally truthful
for the multiple knapsack problem. This can be seen in the example shown
in Figure A.2. In (a) of this figure, the edges are reported truthfully, and
the value-maximizing allocation, assigns A to bin 1 and the other item to
the other bin. In (b) of this figure, bin 1 hides its compatibility with item
A and as a consequence it is better off (in expectation) when the mechanism
maximizes the total value. In (b) of this figure, the tie can be broken randomly
or deterministically (alphabetically) in favor of bin 1. In any case, bin 1 is
better off by manipulation.
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(a) True edges.
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x
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C2 = 1
(b) Manipulated edges.
Figure A.2: Circles represent items and squares represent bins. The value/size of each
item is on its left. Value maximizing assignments are in bold. x≫ 1.
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